Democratizing Brazil's State Enterprises by Case, William
TEXAS PAPERS ON LATIN AMERICA
Pre-publication working papers of the
Institute of Latin American Studies






University of Texas at Austin
Paper No. 89-07
DEMOCRA TIZING BRAZIL'S STATE ENTERPRISES
by William Case
INTRODUCTION
Despite a seemingly global trend toward privatization, public ownership in Brazil is
not a variable, but an indisputable constant. Thus, we may anticipate that the nation's
public enterprises and development banks will continue to represent that state's
ongoing commitment to growth and its readiness to invervene in the marketplace.
Privatization, a comprehensive selling off of public corporations to domestic or
foreign business interests, is simply not to be expected in Brazil during either
authoritarian or politically democratic periods.1
Some development theorists have advanced that a late-industrializing country, in
order to develp further, must acquire an active and presumably authoritarian state.2
This is because less-developed countries (LOCs), while perhaps preferring economic
growth, face special constraints in a world economy largely controlled by more
developed nations: LDCs find their comparative advantage in precisely the sorts of
commodities and traditional exports that hamper their economic sophistication and
from which they now wish to graduate. On this point, both Brazilian advocates of
radical developmental strategies and Brazilian champions of bureaucratic-
authoritarianism in the 1960s were agreed: firm state action was required to ease
Brazil's dependent relationship with other states of the First World. But, while the
radical planners of both the left and right would probably have used the state apparatus
to se al off their national economy from the world (and then proceed to disagree
forthwith over distributive questions within their detached home market), the actions
taken in Brazil in the 1960s were at once less dramatic and more boldo Brazil's
general s recruited ranks of technocrats to reinsert Brazil into the world economy on
more favorable terms: to "deepen" its industrial capacity, establish reverse linkages,
manufacture its own capital goods, and ultimately acquire comparative advantage in
production areas of greater added value than mere primary goods.3
The exclusionary politics that necessarily attend this developmental model are, of
course, unattractive. But it may nonetheless be the case that such austerity is a
2
precondition for the infrastructural projects and programs that are essential to growth
and whose value only later becomes intelligible to mass publics. While the polernic is
ongoing, it remains that Brazil alone among Latin American nations has industrialized
with such effectiveness that it is able now to compete in the global economy in a wide
range of product areas, a capacity that has elevated it to the serniperipheral status of the
newly industrializing economies (NIEs).4 And in the current democratic period,
perhaps, the evident gains can be somewhat more fairly shared.
This paper is divided into four parts. A first part is brief, presenting a series of
background issues relevant to Brazil's state enterprises. I then propose in a second
part a short policy model describing democracy's challenge to Brazilian
decisionmakers and the ways in which some among them, as politicians, might
redirect state enterprises to meet that challenge. I suggest also here a number of
measurable policy areas with which to operationalize "democracy" in terms of state
enterprises, these together with a set of hypotheses both to guide empirical research
and to be tested by the terms of the findings. The paper's third part reports those
research findings, the prompt "democratization" of state enterprises in the period just
prior to the constituent assembly election of 1986; a fourth part presents data collected
just after the election, a check, perhaps, upon state enterprise backsliding.
BACKGROUND
Brazil's State Enterprises, Their History and Rationale
There are, of course, numerous instruments and mechanisms available to the Brazilian
state for purposively altering the course of economic events. This paper is concemed
specifically with its state enterprises and, in passing, development banks. The
govemmental organ most recognizably a predecessor of the state enterprise was the
Federal Council of Commerce (Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior) founded in
1934 and intended "not only to stimulate the country's foreign trade, but also to
provide incentives for the development of certain industries. "5
Independent growth as protection against intemational depression was the explicit
objective, then, in the 1930s. In the 1940s, national security was the rationale for
taking over certain industries, particularly shipping-a line of reasoning that soon lent
itself to actual govemment-owned production enterprises such as the National Motors
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Factory (Fábrica Nacional de Motores, or FNM). The Rio Vale Doce Company
(Companhia de Rio Vale Doce, or CRVD), in contrast, was created in 1942 out of
more expressly nationalist reaction against transnational capital active in iron ore
mining in Minas Gerais.6
In the following decade, notwithstanding the emergence of populist and sometimes
deliquescent politics in Brazil, economic growth remained the government's
underlying preference. Hence, to accumulate the investment capital that the dome stic
private sector could not, the National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico, or BNDE) was founded in 1952 and was dedicated
specifically to modernizing econornic infrastructure. In addition, Petrobrás, one of the
most familiar of Brazil's public corporations, was founded in 1953 and was made
responsible for all petroleum exploration. And finally, to better insure continued
economic expansion in this period, state enterprises were gradually empowered to
control most facets of electricity generation, telecommunications, and public transport
so as to guarantee constancy of supply and often to maintain rates beneath what private
producers might charge.
We see, then, a variety of frontline reasons for Brazil's fostering state enterprises:
(a) to moderate the effects in Brazil of international economic crises; (b) to promote
national security; (c) to bolster state planning capacity and the state's bargaining
position with multinational firms, especially those involved with natural resources; and
(d) in perhaps a combination of "b" and "c" above, to express nationalist sentiment, a
consideration responsible in part for having acquired state enterprises involved in
armaments and aeronautics industries, the extraction of petroleum and mineral s, and
the production of computers and nuclear energy.7 Finally, and most important, state
enterprises were introduced simply (e) to induce rapid industrialization in a late-
industrializing contexto
If these are some of the goals assigned to state enterprises, into what specific
economic policy areas do they tend to go? Brazil's approximately six hundred public
corporations (up from a mere thirty in 1949) are involved in: (a) large infrastructural
projects such as hydroelectric and highway building programs that feature formidable
startup costs and delayed returns and are thus unattractive to local private capital; (b)
resources, mining, and basic manufacturing industries such as oil refining and steel
milling, which are often vulnerable to control by foreign interests or domestic groups
more cornmitted to irnmediate profit than lasting national development; (c) cornmercial
4
and development banking and finance in an economy that is frequentIy afflicted with
capital shortages; and (d) transport, utilities, and services such as data processing,
telecommunications, and insurance in which artificially low prices serve to subsidize
economic expansion in other targeted areas.8
In a sense, provision of such projects and services at favorable rates might be
considered a public good, meant cumulatively to project Brazil's industrial sectors to a
more outIying and impressive growth curve. Refereeing and perpetuating an
arrangement that so consistentIy fosters such benefits may never arise in a market in
which private producers are left to themselves; only an autonomous, well-financed
state possessing extractive and coercive capacity can compel the sort of resource
accumulation that is needed. The market failure, then, that might normally confine an
LDC to comparative advantage in common and undesirable areas may perhaps be
overcome by concerted state action.
State Enterprises in the 1960s and 1970s
In the 1960s, after the military government was able to articulate choices beyond that
of merely stanching the economic damage ascribed to Joao Goulart and populist
politics, the development of public enterprises became a c1early expressed preference.
Accordingly, the rnilitary sought to revitalize and order the "parallel bureaucracy" of its
state companies, reforming their administration in 1967 by the terms of Decree Law
200. Categories of administra~áo direta, autarquia, empresa pública, and sociedades
de economia mista were formed and codified in legal documents and ultimately
formalized by Artic1e 17Oof the Constitution.9
In these peak years of authoritarian politics in Brazil, then, a curious combination
of policy tendencies arose, reflecting the state's simultaneous preference for market
forces as well as for heavy state intervention in the economy. Recognizing that private
domestic capital had not the financial wherewithal to foster and coordinate the activities
essential for growth and, by the logic of the era, national security, the military
government itself acted to mobilize state enterprises for the purpose. By adopting
organizational forms and strategies comparable to firms in the private sector, Brazil's
central planners forcibly assembled a somewhat artificial market economy that
mimicked the First World and ultimately favored private capital and initiative.10
Carneiro Vieira writes that state enterprises at the time used standard corporate
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procedures, promotion practices, marketplace integration strategies, holding
companies, and the like.11 In addition, Brazilian state enterprises, once charged with
resources and set in motion, were in effect made autonomous and left to impement
their respective growth strategies in an economic configuration that has often, if
incorrectIy, been termed "state capitalism."12 And given the autonomy accorded the
parallel bureaucracy and the opportunities for profit-making, state enterprises often
attracted a high caliber of managerial expertise. Thus, there is some agreement among
observers that Brazil's state enterprises during this periad-in marked contrast perhaps
to those of other nations-were often competently run, particularly if one uses strict
efficiency and financial criteria for assessment.13
There is much discussion in the literature of the degree of centralized control that
characterized the adrninistration of Brazilian state enterprises during this periodo Some
authors focus on the highly concentrated nature of investment decisionmaking and
upon executive capacity alternatively to create or terminate enterprises in strict
accordance with centrally devised development plans.14 Others suggest a more diffuse
process of oversight-vigilancia, verfica9áo, andfiscaliza9áo-exercísed through
controle parlamentar and controle por entidades fiscalizadoras .15 And perhaps a third
and very different interpretation suggests actually a lack of centralized authority
encouraging less local administrative efficiency than an "indiscriminate explosion of
enterprises, foundations, and autarquias at all formallevels of power in the country:
federal, state, and municipal."16 Indeed, the more one looks into the Brazilian case in
the 1960s and 1970s, the more one is made aware that despite often indisputable
economic growth inspired by technocratic skill, there existed also much tension and
organizational incoherence within the state apparatus. Thus, while we are routinely
treated to the image of an orderly tri-pe formula in authoritarian Brazil implemented by
a purposive state actor, this at times belies the politicized nature of bureaucratic
decisionmaking.
Peter Evans has documented the difficulties, noting first that while the automobile
industry was the driving force behind Brazil's industrialization in the 1960s, such
status clearly belonged to the petrochemical industry from the middle to late 1970s.17
The Camacari project in Bahia was a key element in the new "linkage-generating
strategy of unbalanced growth," an effort to create developmental "poles" in outIying
areas around which further locally based growth was expected to rally.18 But it is
Evans' conclusion that a highly capital-intensive petrochemical complex was
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inappropriate 10 Bahia's developmental needs; that is to say, resollrces were merely
brought in from elsewhere, proeessed, and removed form Bahia without mueh
diseernible local impaet either in terms of ereating new employment or downstream
industries. The eomplex should have been more profitably located in the state af Silo
Paulo; projects assigned to Bahia shauld have been of a very different and perhaps
labar-intensive nature more attuned to the causes of the state's underdevelopment.
But the interesting questian that arises here addresses less the ultimate disutility of
the Camacari project than how the actual decison to locate the facility in Bahia was
reached. While we might once have attributed the poliey-whether tinally a suecess or
not-to rational and expert technoeratic planning, Evans portrays a proeess more akin
ta the random outcomes of proverbial "pulling and hauling":
The entrepreneurial initiatives that led to Camacari did not emerge from
policy decisions made by the state apparatus as a whole, or even primarily
from the efforts of individual presidents and ministers. The entrepreneurial
thrust carne from a confluence of less powerful int1uenees. . . . The shaping
was done less by overall poliey decision than by informal, personal contaets
among the individuals involved. Most of these were more technoeratie than
entrepreneurial in terms of their roles and training, but the end result of their
activities was entrepreneurial on a grand scale.19
As the 1970s unfolded and the Brazilian "economic miracle" lInraveled,
contradietions within the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime revealed a marked absence
of political institutionalization.2o Evans has pointed out the laek of eonsisteney within
the state component of the tri-pe arrangement; it remains now to show briefly the
disenehantment experienced by other members of that eoalition, prineipally private
industrialists. Cardoso has specified three chief objections raised by the private sector
to the seeond National Development Plan (PND 11)and its emphasis upon the capital
goods sector: (a) that it perpetuated an undue state enterprise and nearly "leviathan"
presence; (b) that business activity was saddled with onerous investment and saving
requirements; (e) that multinational corporations (MNCs) were given a seemingly
excessive share of Brazilian economie opportunity (e.g., allowing Fiat to loeate in
Minas Gerais, thereby jeopardizing loeally owned automobile produetion in Silo
Paulo); and (d) that sustained borrowing was creating alarming levels of national
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indebtedness. Cardoso writes: "It was against this background that the private sector
discovered 'democracy' and some industrialists even discovered the constitution."21
The government thus fostered a softer front to broaden its appeal, offering in
succession the decompressao, the distensao, and finally, the abertura meant to
substitute politically liberalizing measures for flagging economic hopes.
At the same time, the government chose not to let the "rniracle" stall completely in
global recession, and so made up for declining exports and loss of investment capital
with foreign loans. But as the decade progressed, the government was unable to
bOITOWfurther and so pressed its state enterprises to bOITOWin its stead.22 Brazil's
public corporations had a sufficientIy well-regarded reputation for good management,
and foreign bankers were obliging in making loans; as a result, state enterprises were
burdened with an unaccustomed indebtedness that carne to erode managerial
effectiveness and morale. While Brazil's public corporations were always
controversial in many respects and vexed orthodox capitalists and the more egalitarian-
rninded alike, their levels of financial efficiency and productivity were unusually good
compared to those of most other nations. And it was precisely these qualities that
finally led the government to exploit-and, indeed, undermine-its own state
enterprises.
STA TE ENTERPRISES IN THE MID-1980S
Regarding Brazil's previously authoritarian development policies, Kenneth Paul
Erickson writes:
Domestic social and political tradeoffs. . . do not force themselves upon the
consciousness of the policy makers. . .. Thus they continue to be ignored.
These costs are not imposed personally upon the technocrats, but rather upon
Brazil's poor majority. They do not even occur in the domain for which the
technocrats accept responsibility, specifically the most modern sectors of the
economy. By narrowly circumscribing their area of competence, Brazilian
technocratic policy makers can avoid confronting the evidence that, on social
and political grounds, the model they have created is basically flawed.23
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A central thesis guiding this paper is that a government committed to liberalizing its
political regime must necessarily assign its public enterprises additional duties apart
from purely economic ones. The precedent for using state enterprises for something
other than efficiency has been set in Brazil by their having been offered as virtual
collateral for foreign loans. Authorities of a more competitive regime may thus find it
reasonable to assign to state enterprises still other, explicitly social and electorally
relevant, goals as well.
We see evidence of this in Mexico, for example, where many state enterprises are
used as much for mobilizing support for authorities and political structures as for
performing functions essential to economic growth.24 Brazil in the 1960s was able to
avoid such tradeoffs, substituting outright repression for redistributive compromises
effected in part through public corporations. But the situation in the mid-1980s is very
different, and elected officials, to be reelected, may have to enhance the electorate's
possibilities of immediate consumption. A very brief public policy model may be
useful in making this clearer.
Problem Definition
In the mid-1980s, the primary goal of elected officials is to advance policies that: (a)
win them reelection; (b) sustain economic growth; and (c) reduce public sector deficits.
An authoritarian government with unquestioned coercive capacity can focus on the
second and third concerns; a democratically elected set of incumbents must more often
concentrate scarce resources upon the first.
The Brazilian government, while perhaps more democratic at present than it has
ever be en before, is still, in a twist upon Juan Linz's conceptualization, an inchoate
"democratic situation" in which the military continues to exercise a fundamental veto
power over civilian officials' policy choices.25 Thus, Brazil's elected decisionmakers
will have mixed feelings regarding populist expenditures; the conviction held in the
current Sarney government is surely that economic stabilization and continued growth
are the more significant goals. It is unlikely, then, that we will find entirely
unambiguous transitions in the operation of Brazil's state enterprises; instead, the
present govemment may communicate egalitarian, redistributive intention to voters
prior to key elections, then resume pursuit of the second and third objectives after
having safely retained office. We have recently witnessed, for example, popular
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Cruzado Plan price freezes being revoked and Sarney's "price inspectors" being left
disappointed in the immediate wake of his government's November 1986 electoral
success and subsequent breathing space.26
Policy Alternatives and Choice
In seeking to democratize state enterprises, Brazil's elected decisionmakers enjoy a
number of options. We shall discuss here some of them, associating each with a
hypothesis suggesting likely policy outcomes in the present period of competitive
politics.
Public Ownership v. Privatization-Rationalization. A "public-private"
ownership dimension of policy choice occurs: re gime incumbents might opt either to
retain state enterprises, perhaps merging those that duplicate functions, or sell
specified components of parallel bureaucracy to private investors.
Hypothesis. As stated at the outset, comprehensive privatization is not seriously
considered in Brazil: state capacity is as desired by elected authorities interested in the
prompt if limited redistribution of societal shares as it is by those committed to an
authoritarian growth model of capital accumulation.
Centralization v. Decentralization. We have seen that during the authoritarian
era, state planners, after endowing public enterprises with financial and managerial
resources, dispersed them to operate essentially as private firms with independent
decisionmaking authority. To remake those enterprises with more egalitarian
purpose-a social objective that may be resisted by efficiency-oriented directors-
democratizing regime officials may be forced to concentrate authority.
Hypothesis. The reintroduction of electoral politics in Brazil will cause elected
regime incumbents to initially-surprisingly, perhaps-centralize state enterprise
operation, redirect technocratic managers from "pure" development models to social
goals. Centralization, firmer control will be needed at least in early stages because
technocrats will resist such reorientation and the new, politicized criteria of success.
State Enterprise Pricing Policy.27 During Brazil's authoritarian period, the
autonomy of public enterprises increased under the terms of the 1967 administrative
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refonn law so that populist price structures of previous years might be rolled back in
selected areas. And so, on the one hand, the government instructed Siderbras, the
state-owned metals-producing finn, to decrease the price of steel so that automobiles
and major appliances might be manufactured to benefit privileged segments of
consumers. At the same time, rates for private electricity consumption and public
transportation rnight be increased, in effect a regressive subsidy adversely affecting the
poor.
Hypothesis. Subordinating Brazil's state enterprises to the needs of elected
officials should yield price freezes or reduction on prices of popularly consumed, state
enterprise-furnished goods; expensive consumer durables available to Brazil's more
privileged consumers should become more expensive still.
State Enterprise Financing. Public corporations during the authoritarian period
were autonomous and encouraged to be as self-financing and profit-oriented as
possible. Inasmuch, then, as state enterprise-generated surpluses were either generally
fed back into the enterprises responsible for them, their insularity cannot be said to
have had socially redistributive effect.
Hypothesis. In the democratic period, we should see distribution of surplus fram
high-income to less-profitable enterprises available for patronage and the production of
popularly consumed goods. Further, this would require increased administrative
centralization at the start, a concerted effort to shift managerial favor from profitability
of individual state enterprises to concem for mas s electorates.
Public Sector Lending Policies. In the 1960s and 1970s, the BNDE derived
half of its resources fram the forced savings of workers channeled into social security
funds, and lent them in tum to major finns. Sirnilarly, the Bank of Brazil made loans
in the agrarian sector to only the largest landholders and agribusiness firms.
Hypothesis. In the mid-1980s, forced savings are more likely extracted from
wealthier segments of Brazil's economy, centering levies, perhaps, on expensive
consumer items rather than upon labor union pension funds. Credit should become
increasingly available to small businesses and to those seeking to take advantage of
current land refonn praposals and to establish themselves as settlers.
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State Enterprise Employment and Wage Practices. State enterprises
pursuing economic rationality during the authoritarian period hired no more workers
than were necessary and paid them no more than was essential. Technocratic
managers, on the other hand, were paid attractive salaries so that expert management
could be retained.
Hypothesis. In the present periad, state enterprises will be exploited as a source of
party patronage. Hiring should increase markedly in preparation for elections; future
wage settlements should be more beneficial to labor. Conversely, a combination of
less attractive salaries and reduced autonomy and emphasis upon profits will serve to
draw less able management.
State Enterprise Choice of Technology. The preference for capital intensive
technology is characteristic of authoritarian governments determined to industrialize
rapidly. The result, however, is often a dual, skewed economy displaying fuIl
development in some production areas and a traditional deprivation in others. Indeed,
poorer segments of the population may be made worse off than they might otherwise
have been by the austerity imposed to make capital-intensive industrialization possible.
Hypothesis. An elected government will instruct state enterprises to adopt more
labor intensive production methods to simultaneously reduce short-term operation
costs and increase opportunities for hiring. Technological capacity and ultimately
cheaper production methods will be sacrificed, but immediate quality of life indicators
and vote-getting prospects will be improved.
State Enterprise Purchasing Practices. Autonomous, profit-oriented state
enterprises will purchase from the least expensive suppliers, often foreign firms.
Again, while promoting efficiency, this will contribute little in the immediate periad to
local employment and overall popularity of the governmem.
Hypothesis. To provide the electorate with greater employment opportunities and
to retain government expenditures within the local economy, state enterprises should
purchase from domestic suppliers whenever this is viable. Further, and closely related
to this, state enterprises can be expected to call for the development and protection of
domestic technological capability.
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Location of State Enterprise Production Facilities. When location of state
enterprise facilities is a matter of government discretion, authoritarian decisionmakers
committed to unqualified grawth have typically built upon existing capacity (Camacari
being a very visible exception). By concentrating plant capacity, gains occur
exponentially; by distributing it evenly about the country, gains are more dispersed and
delayed. Nonetheless, the well-being of the population in many areas of the country is
thus neglected by concentrating resources in only a few areas, a fact that only an
authoritarian government can long overlook.
Hypothesis. To the extent that new state enterprise facilities are constructed and
projects undertaken in democratic Brazil, they will increasingly be located according to
criteria reflecting voter population rather than economic rationality. Local politicians
throughout Brazil will want to enhance their patranage resources and local prosperity;
insofar as they are able, politicians of the same party at the center will oblige them.
State Enterprise Corruption. While, of course, a controversial choice dimension,
corruption remains still an option available to state decisionmakers: public funds may
be distributed for private, unofficial consumption, and to a variety of contrasting ends.
Accordingly, state personnel at high or low levels may be selected for administrative
largesse.
Hypothesis. New patterns of private consumption of public resources will divert
benefits fram key, highly placed bureaucratic actors to newly recruited officials at
lower levels. Distribution of such reward, in order to maximize electoral returns
favorable to incumbents, may revert to a generalized patronage system of
empreguismo (overhiring). Further, in connection with political parties, it might be
expected that with the instauration of a veritable spoils system, the party that first wins
national elections and packs the state apparatus with its supporters may consolidate its
preeminent electoral advantage. Assuming, then, that President Sarney can maintain
his Oemocratic Alliance coalition, the Liberal Frant Party (Partido de Frente Liberal, or
PFL) and the Brazilian Oemocratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento
Oemocratic Brasileiro, or PMDB) may remain entrenched in both electoral office and
the parallel bureaucracy.
The Nature of State Enterprise-Produced Goods. This last and perhaps most
fundamental dimension is at least partially related to the matter of pricing. What areas
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of production are state enterprises currentIy emphasizing: the grand infrastructural
projects of authoritarian years, the production of durables and technical seIVices that
necessarily postpone popular sector consumption, or the sorts of seIVices and small-
scale finished items that might be made more immediately available to ordinary
Brazilian consumers?
Hypothesis. While recognizing that deficit pressures are also at work, it may be
hypothesized still that new infrastructural project spending will be reduced; to the
degree that new infrastructural project spending is undertaken at all, it will target the
immediate requirements of mass publics (e.g., expansion of mass transit systems and
perhaps even hydroelectric projects intended primarily to supply energy to private
homes).
The tradeoffs involved in opting for particular developmental strategies should be
clear. An authoritarian state with sufficient commitment willlikely be better able to
create the conditions for rapid economic growth than a democratic government. Of
course, an authoritarian state need not necessarily dedicate its capacity and resources to
growth-it might instead occupy itself with enriching key insiders and imposing a veil
of unaccountability. But this does not accurately characterize technocratic
decisionmaking in Brazil in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when corruption was
moderated and 10 percent growth rates were recorded annually. Even in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, when massive 10ans were acquired to perpetuate the "miracle," the
funds are seen to have been put generally to good use, not frittered away or embezzled
outright as was so often the case elsewhere in Latin America.28
lncumbents of a democratically elected regime, however, will not thrust the
unpleasantness of extreme austerity and violence upon the polity; indeed, they cannot.
Power relationships in a democratic context are ratified by winning constituencies, and
this is not done by force or by assurances of national security and greatness by the end
of the century.29 Votes are won by making life more immediately bearable for as
much of the voting public as possible. Thus, there is much pressure upon politicians
in less-developed countries to behave in populist fashion, to present for immediate
mas s consumption such surplus as may be available.30
State enterprises, seIVing to provide government with efficacious policymaking
tools and heightened capacity, will naturally be assigned a variety of roles. The
argument here is that Brazil's state enterprises will be called upon during the current
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period to engage less in the creation of national wea1th, and to operate more as outlets
for its popular allocation.
The remainder of this paper will consist of an effort to chart the course of that
changed state enterprise behavior, and to document empirical evidence related to the
hypotheses and dimensions presented above. The methodology for obtaining and
ordering that evidence involved systematically reading Brazilian publications and
financial reports, and interpreting data on state enterprises by the terms of the
hypotheses. This may create two sources of complaint. First, it might be thought that
by interpreting information by the terms of hypotheses meant actually to be tested, the
hypotheses can themselves never be falsified: the study might thus appear to be more a
deductive exercise based upon a model inadequately tested beforehand than any
ingenuous induction. In defense, lean only suggest that the data never "speak for
themselves," and that while the researcher, of course, remains vigilant, he/she cannot
help but be persuaded by preconceived notions. Next, objections might be raised
regarding the secondary nature of the data. Here, I would remind the reader that
primary data are obtained only at great expense if at all: when they have chosen, state
enterprise personnel have been very successful in keeping information from even the
Brazilian government.31
EVIDENCE FROM THE PRECONSTITUENT ASSEMBL y ELECTION
PERIOD, 1986 32
Political-Economic Setting
Early in 1985, then Finance Minister Dornelles reacted to deficit pressures by freezing
all new state expenditures and, indeed, cutting existing public investment levels.
Additionally, to promote administrative reform so that budget-cutting might be
institutionalized, he proposed that all federal government spending be consolidated and
that estimates be sent to the new Congress for review. Such congressional oversight,
together with the "social accord" tenor of the Fourth National Development Plan
intended to combat poverty and inflation simultaneously, would indicate a policy of
democratizing within a context of fiscal austerity. Further, insofar as the state
enterprises were concerned, it was anticipated that cutting the enterprises' budgets
would provide funding for the plan, an evident redistribution of resources further
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communicated by the new emphasis upon foodstuffs and agrarian reform in the
National Plan of Agrarian Reform.33
In early 1986, public faith in the Sarney government's willingness to act upon its
state social goals began to waver. The government responded with the Cruzado Plan,
designed to alter inflationary expectations and saving patterns conditioned by long-
entrenched indexation. Retail prices were frozen on many goods and wages were
curbed, though at a level favoring popular sector consumers and earning the plan's
sponsors widespread populist appeal. What were the Cruzado Plan's effects on the
publicly owned enterprises? They too found themselves unable to raise prices, of
course, and thus quickly exhausted their ability to generate funds for supplementary
investment. State enterprise sales volume, like that of most all producers, was
suddenly much increased, but the artifically low prices ultimately worsened their
deficits and in turn contributed to the undermining of the Cruzado Plan's success.34
This paper argues that, despite the finally negative economic impact, state
enterprises will be subordinated to measures of this sort in the months prior to
important elections. Accordingly, Sarney cultivated the sobriquet "father of the poor"
and was charged by O Estado de Silo Paulo with neogetulismo (i.e., reviving Getulio
Vargas' populist spending approach).35 Among the policy outputs quickly
implemented by Sarney were: (a) granting social security to rural workers; (b) the
creation of 100 new labor tribunals for addressing labor questions; and (c) renewed
expression of support for Brazilian market reserve in the informatics industries-the
nationalism and populist message here becoming more apparent when we recall that
Petrobras, Siderbras, and their promotion of domestic economic autonomy were
begun by Vargas.
Continuing Official Cornrnitrnent to State Enterprises
The combination, then, of state deficits, public spending cuts, Cruzado Plan price
freezes, and populist redistribution would appear to bode ill for Brazil's state
enterprises in the months prior to elections. Yet it is argued here that state enterprises
are a permanent fixture in Brazil: they can, after all, be used as much for purposes of
electoral poli tic s as for insuring long-term economic growth. What evidence is there
that the state is attempting to provide its public corporations with at least some minimal
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level of solvency that will allow them to resurface and make developmental initiatives
in presumably more prosperous years ahead?
First, in the matter of financing the enterprises in an era of price freezes, we see
that funds have been redistributed from the consistentIy profitable Petrobras to other
state companies unable to sustain themselves, a move that prompted the resignation of
Petrobras' director.36 The dynamism of which state enterprises are sometimes capable
is exemplified by Braspetro, the foreign exploration subsidiary of Petrobras, which
has aggressively sought contracts abroad "consolidating its international position
despite the period of low investment in the oil industry."37 That the proceeds from
this should in turn be made available to other state enterprises might be se en as
evidence that democratic authorities will in fact be redistribute funding among
enterprises to keep them all operable even at the risk of losing existing managerial
expertise.
Second, we might consider the emprestimos compulsorios, the forced loans
featured in the Targets Plan and Cruzado 11,or Cruzadinho, introduced in July 1986
and meant primarily to discourage consumer spending on durable s unleashed by the
original Cruzado Plan. The revenue derived from the loans (ostensibly repayable to
consumers in three to four years) was to be used in part to reduce the debts of the
public corporations.38 Too, pressure was further removed from the enterprises by
reducing their contribution to the National Development Fund (FND). Deposits in the
fund, earmarked both for labor intensive social programs to help "Brazil's poorest"
and a variety of state company-supervised infrastructural projects in areas of energy,
steel, transportation, and cornmunications were to come from 30-percent levies placed
upon gasoline, automobiles, and other less publicized and less progressively taxable
items.39 While this record is obviously incomplete, two apparent mechanisms have
been used by elected authorities to maintain state enterprises undergoing a period of
reduced activity: the government will circulate capital among them, and additionally
secure such new and endogeneous funding as may be required 10 keep them in
business.
Privatization
Students of U.S. political democracy will generally associate democratization with
privatization, the transfer of state-owned property to the private sector. Liberty, after
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all, is thought to be manifested in the right to acquire and hold private praperty. And
in the present Brazilian setting, we sometimes find officials duly expressing similar
sentiments, though privatization is likely found desirable in this instance less because it
pramotes some conceptualization of liberty (and, perhaps, further concentration of
actual ownership and commensurately diminished popularity for regime incumbents)
than because it would ease state operating costs and budgetary deficits.
Early on, President Sarney specified as one of his primary goals the
"debureaucratization" of the economy, in part to make the private sector more
responsible for economic growth.40 The Brazilian Coffee Institute (Instituto Braileira
de Cafe, or IBC), setting Brazil's coffee-marketing policy for the past thirty years,
was targeted first for privatization; Brazil's coffee producers would then presumably
have the authority and organizational means to determine their own marketing policies.
While the government studied the implications of such a sale, the first actual instance
of privatization occurred: the sale of a state-owned luxury hotel in Blumenau, Santa
Catarina. While a minor transaction and of no threat to the proponents of statism, the
sale signaled a clear shift in policy emphasis in that the hotel had initially been
confiscated by the military government fram a deputado cassado in 1970.41 Thus, we
witness the transfer of praperty fram a politician, to the state, and finally to the private
sector.
Brazil's businessmen generally applaud the apparent trend and have aggregated
their interests in the National Free Enterprise Movement. In existence since 1979 and
representing some three hundred firms, the movement had advertised its privatizing
objectives through the nation's media, especially in the months before the November
elections.42 Sarney, of course, has expressed sympathy with their demands, and it is
known that Silo Paulo business interests were permitted considerable influence in his
cabinet in 1985.
But how much actual privatization was Sarney able to implement in 1986? A first
case involves control of the nation's telephone system exercised by the Ministry of
Communication. Private commercial interests have recentIy pratested the continuance
of this policy, citing the shortages of lines and phones, the general inefficiency of
operation, and even the bothersome policy pravision wherein private parties are barred
by law fram selling their telephones to one another.43 But thus far, the government
has responded only by expressing its determination to retain ownership of
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communications systems, a posture that casts irnmediate doubt upon its true privatizing
intento
This particular example may not in fact be a fair test of that intent, as
cornmunication networks are regarded as national infrastructure and clearly within the
national security sphere. But what of those instances in which the government has
itself selected the privatization agenda? Returning to the example of the IBC, we find
that Castelo Branco, Minister of Industry and Commerce, while able to seU off the
institute's airplanes, was otherwised forced to content himself with transforming the
organization into the new National Coffee Policy Council. And though employee
levels were cut from 4,500 to 500, the figure is misleading in that those made
redundant by the terms of the new council were simply transferred to the Ministry of
Information. Bureaucratic employment, then, can apparentIy be shifted about, but not
appreciably reduced.
Targets for privatization are still ambitiously touted, however: the Sugar and
Alcohol Institute, with 5,300 employees, has been slated for sale, and thirteen other
agencies and most all offices representing the paraUel bureaucracy abroad are
scheduled to be closed outright.44 But while an official schedule can be developed,
actual decisions are difficult to make in the months before elections: disturbing vested
interests or reducing capacity for empreguismo would adversely affect the poli tic al
fortunes of incumbents. While token and politicaUy cost-free privatization might be
advanced, then, serious dismantlement of state ownership patterns might be
conceivable only after electoral mandates have been renewed.
Reforming State Enterprise Administration
The evident reluctance of the Brazilian state to divest itself conclusively of any of its
enterprises does not necessarily imply that it will fail to rationalize their administration.
In fact, given the urgency of the existing budget constraints, the government
seemingly must take some measures to that end, though in a manner that does not
alienate significant portions of the electorate.
In view of these twin imperatives, then, let us consider the administrative
proposals that have been made thus faro Sarney has explicitly warned that the "state
should not be considered a 'hat rack of patronage'" and that an end must be put to
clientelismo.45 Accordingly, the following reform measures have be en undertaken or
19
prescribed: (a) a Ministry of Public Administration has been created (eventually itself
constituting a bureaucratic bottleneck, as we shall see later); (b) an "executive group of
public administration" composed of five ministers has been formed for the purpose of
modernizing state apparatus; (c) state enterprises have been given ninety days to
present plan s of "deactivation" of specified state-owned goods and property; (d) the
Treasury has initiated a crackdown on the apparently widespread practice of
bureaucrats claiming two or more salaries; and (e) a national school of public
administration has been proposed. Other rationalizing structures already installed and
distinctly addressing the state enterprises include the Public Coordinating Committee
and the Tribunal of Accounts Union.46 Further, the reform imperative has been
extended to the banking sector. First, the Central Bank, which may be treated here as
an autonomous if very specialized state organization, has invoked more realistic
interest rates and tighter credit policies in the wake of consumer spending stimulated
by the Cruzado Plan; and second, the impact of deindexation, or "monetary
correction," upon inflation has been such that "most of Brazil's 120 banks will now
have to close some branches, reduce staffs, improve efficiency, and accept lower
profits. "47
The point here is that some degree of rationalization does seem to be occurring
presently in Brazil, a trend hypothesized as likely to be moderated by electoral
consideration. But to assess more completely the scope of administrative reform
effected in the period before the Constituent Assembly elections, we might consider
the matter of bureaucratic corruption.
State Enterprise Corruption
Given this officially expressed preference for rationalization, a related, though difficult
to assess, matter is the impact upon corruption in state enterprises. Though probably
impossible to test, it could be hypothesized that in a bureaucratic setting
simultaneously experiencing the need for rationalization and reduced costs on the one
hand, and for the enhancement of electoral resources on the other, the nature of
corruption would be different from that of a closed and authoritarian setting sustained
by foreign borrowing. In the current period, then, there may well be a shift from
high-Ievel theft of state resources to a more dispersed distribution at lesser bureaucratic
levels.
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A discussion of corruption offers us a place for transition from economic to
democratic imperatives confronting Brazil's state enterprises. First, while the data are
incomplete and the actual events perhaps staged, it is interesting that in this period of
democratization, reports of misdeeds in high places are in fact surfacing and given
prominence in the popular press. For example, a governmental commission has been
appointed to investigate illegal dealings between the Central Bank and a holding
company, Auxiliar: after selling stock and depositing the funds in the Central Bank,
Auxiliar took possession of them once again for expon abroad or illegallending.48
This might seem precisely the sort of wrongdoing that a democratizing government
might wish to publicly expose, decrying in nationalist terms the occurrence of capital
flight.
Another example of state enterprise illegality that has be en permitted to come to
light involves the director of the Petrochemical Company of the Northeast, a holding
of Camacari Petrochemical Pole of Bahia. The investigative Comissao de Valores
Mobiliarios (CVM) has accused the director of insider trading, that is, buying and
selling stock in an associated enterprise, Acrinor, on the basis of "insider"
information.49 The significance of such events does not lie, of course, in their simply
occurrlng, but rather, in the fact that the government has allowed investigations and
press coverage. Certainly we may not expect in Brazil anything akin to Mexico's
campaign of "moral renovation," but it could be hypothesized still that Brazil's elected
officials are seeking some of the same ends to better the electorate's evaluation of them
and the polítical system generally.
The Electoral Imperative
Empreguismo. Though the government has proven willing to acquiesce in the
public exposure of corruption among directors of state enterprises, it has conversely
shown itself more tolerant of what may be broadly defined as corruption at a les ser
bureaucratic leve!. Overhiring, patronage, the spoils system-empreguismo, in the
Brazilian lexicon-all involve the admission of individual s onto the state payroll in
return for their having provided regime incumbents with some form of significant
poli tic al support. This has long been a pattern in Brazil, of course, though it was
practiced somewhat less during the recent authoritarian period.50 In 1984, on the eve
of the era of competitive politics, the Brazilian state employed 4.2 million persons at
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the federal, state, and locallevels, 1.8 million of whom worked for federal- and state-
owned enterprises.51 The problem was already acute prior to the current rounds of
"happiness trains" that have saddled government rosters with perhaps half a million
thoroughly id le workers.52 President Sarney has himself seemingly contradicted his
rationalizing objectives by finding a position for his daughter in an auxiliary
organization of the Senate.
More seriously, and with specific reference to state enterprises, it has been alleged
that control of patronage potential arising from those enterprises has been ceded
exclusively to the Liberal Front Party.53 On the face of it, this is entirely plausible: the
PFL emerged from the Social Democratic Party (PDS), which in turn represented
perhaps the purest strain of the old Alliance of National Renovation (ARENA) linked
to rnilitary interests. And the military, for its part, retaining in the democratic period a
very pronounced leadership presence in the state enterprises, might well require that
public corporation patronage be exercised at least indirectly on its behalf as part of its
price for assenting to the democratization process. Beyond this, state enterprise funds
were reputedly used to finance all manner of PFL campaigning activity before the
November elections. A particular example involved using Electrobras money to print
PFL literature and stage rallies in Santa Catarina.
Further evidence revealing Sarney's willingness to allow the PFL an especiallY
beneficial measure of state values appears early in 1986: in formulating a new cabinet,
Sarney distributed the most important ministries to the PFL, a move greatly angering
the more electorally popular PMDB.54 Again, this may well have been the price
extracted by conservative interests in exchange for their remaining within the AD at the
nationallevel. At the state level, further characterized by extreme c1eavages, Samey is
said specifically to have steadied the coalition with extensive use of empreguismo.55
Failed Administrative Reform. Within the general discussion of electoral
imperatives, 1 would like to return to the issue of rationalizing the state apparatus. If
such costly electoral expedience as cited above is in fact necessary at the federal as well
as state levels, it is hardly surprising that Sarney's proposed reform objectives were so
sidetracked during the election campaigning that only the rhetoric endured. Various
cabinet members responded by complaining publicly that bureaucratic decisionmaking
remained slow and ineffectual and that reforms were not taking hold. Minister of
Public Administration Aluizo Alves, for example, decried the ongoing practice of
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empreguismo and the fact that proposed reforms had still not as yet been codified:56
indeed, the entire process had as of August 1986 been bogged down in the new
Ministry of Public Administration itself for more than a year.57 Jeova Magalhaes
Sobreira, executive secretary of the Interministerial Privatization Council, clearly cited
the difficulty as rooted in Brazil's political machine: "Public sector organs were always
molded in a way to serve personal and regional politics. "58 And in fact, it is precisely
through personal and regional political linkages that even the banks, only briefly
chastened by the Cruzado Plan, have been able to circumvent Central Bank reforms
and regenerate their previous pattems of accumulation that deny Brazil "an efficient
intermediary between savings and investment. "59
The ultimate lack of reform success in the preelection period is nowhere made
more clear than in the Tribunal of Accounts Union having openly censured President
Sarney himself for his evident abetting of public sector overhiring.60 The
irreconcilability of economic and political realities is readily apparent during this
periad: the particular challenge posed to political incumbents would seem to lie in their
refraining from overloading the golde n goose of the parallel bureaucracy with
excessive and ruinous empreguismo. . . .but such restraint is all for nothing from the
point of view of politicians, if in leaving the public corporations intact, they
themselves go down to political defeat.
Credit Policies. Among the hypotheses In this paper is one proposing that
democratization serves to make more credit available for popular sector consumption
despite state efforts to remedy deficits. But just as empreguismo has clearly survived
administrative reform, we may similarly expect that electoral imperatives will be
observed in the area of credit, at least in a much publicized, symbolic sense. The
original hypotheses have been qualified, suggesting now that the democratic quality of
state enterprise activity will be pronounced only prior to major elections. And after
such elections, a more "predemocratic" distributive pattem regarding credit willlikely
be resumed. But given this assumption, what evidence exists to support the
contention that credit will at least appear to be more available to the popular sector
before it is called upon to vote?
While the Agrarian Reform Plan has largely stalled before determined and even
violent landholder resistance, the government has still recentIy initiated a Rural
Development Fund that possesses a decidedly populist flavor (if populism can be said
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to exist in rural Latin America). Sarney's stated aim is to "eliminate hunger and misery
from the social map" while reducing the need for agricultural imports.61 This is
ostensibly to be achieved by the Bank of Brazil making credit available to smallholders
through the fund to cultivate rice, beans, manioc, and other basic staples that the
government might then buy back. Such a policy is especially striking when it is
recalled that the Bank of Brazil was previously most interested in providing credit to
large landowners and agribusinesses engaged in export farming.
In the urban sector the Small Business Law-passed, as it happens, by the
Figueiredo administration in 1984 as something of a parting gesture of political and
economic liberalization-has resulted in the BNDE at last loosening credit policies
toward small- and medium-sized firms. Technical assistance is provided through a
mechanism known as CEBRAE and, while it is implemented through lcoal
organizations, overarching authority resides in the Planning Ministry.62 Plainly,
Brazil's current authorities appreciate the electoral rewards likely arising from the state-
supported creation of many thousands of businesses, favorable votes from new
proprietors as well as those employed by them (although small and medium firms tend
to be labor intensive and thus require more workers, small-scale business
organizations preclude mass-Ievel unionization and the los s of those votes to working
class parties). Notwithstanding Brazil's current decisionmakers' still harboring a
preference for capital intensive industrialization by large firms and elite business
groups, then, they have yielded to an alternative production mode with greater vote-
generating capacity in the period prior to the Constituent Assembly election.
In contrast to this, perhaps, the Supremo Tribunal Federal ruled in September
against those borrowing from the National Housing Bank (BNH), determining that
home loans would henceforth no longer be readjusted on the basis of the minimum
wage, bur rather, on the basis of variations in the ORTN.63 This formula is apparently
far less advantageous to borrowers, a fact that in terms of the hypotheses is open to a
number of interpretations. On the one hand, it might seem that BNH credit had
previously been specified for comparatively poor groups preparing for small home
ownership; rates, after all, were pegged to the minimum wage. Revoking such
favorable rates might thus seem either a regressive policy measure on the part of the
government meant to correct the BNH's 200-billion-cruzado deficit-which plainly
disconfirms the hypotheses-or perhaps merely an idiosyncratic ruling by a newly
independent judiciary whose overriding state preferences constitute yet further
24
evidence of democratization. On the other hand, we recall that the BNH was initially
the creature of the military government, and that people able even to contemplate the
purchase of homes, however modest, represent a privileged sector. As such,
terrninating the easy acquisition of home loans so that funds rnight be made available in
other forrns to a broader constituency would in fact be in keeping with the hypotheses.
It is hard to know precisely the implications of the tribunal's ruling: the matter is
introduced here not so much to shed light upon democratization of Brazil's state
enterprises as perahps to show how difficult the shedding of light on the issue can
sometimes be. In any event, we shall see shortly that the entire affair of the BNH has
nearly become acadernic.
EVIDENCE FROM THE POSTCONSTITUENT ASSEMBL y ELECTION
PERIOD, 1986
The Constituent Assembly elections of November 1986 inc1uded ten thousand
candidates from over forty parties, making Brazil the Third World's largest political
democracy after India. B ut the meaningfulness of that democracy was perhaps
diminished by Brazil's uniquely vigorous regionalism and competition at the state
level, phenomena that diverted public attention from national issues to local ones.64
The personality of candidates was often more important than their national party
identification; respective parties themselves, frequentIy more interested in local rather
than national power, sometimes found themselves allied in one state or at one leve! oE
government and quite opposed in another. These features, together with the extreme
expense of campaigning and the prevalence of wealthy candidates, raise doubts about
the institutionalization and coherence of Brazilian democratic procedure.
Restoring the Tri-Pe
lE Brazil finds itself in a postelectoral "democratic situation," egalitarian gestures
should be promptIy scaled back and commitment oE elites to "accumulating"
development strategies should again become apparent. Little enough time has elapsed
in which to research that expectation, but already we have some indications of this
occurring in the state-owned companies.
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One might argue that Brazilian authorities are contemplating a partial resurrection
of the old tri-pe formula to again attract international capital. The Cruzado Plan, by
freezing wages and prices at a level comparatively beneficial to popular sector
consumption, served to win votes in November, but ultimately depleted Brazil's
foreign currency reserves and its capacity to exporto Additionally, foreign investors
have been unnerved by the populist tampering with the national economy, inconsistent
decisionmaking, and uncertainty over the sentiment of the Constituent Assembly, and
their reticence has greatIy aggravated Brazil's capital shortages. A detected Brazilian
policy return, then, to collaboration with international capital, and secondarily, with
the local bourgeoisie, may be interpreted as "undemocratic" in that it implies a restored
tri-pe emphasis upon exports and neglect of the internal market.
An early-and perhaps politically acceptable--overture made in the postelection
months involves Embraer, the state-owned aeronautics company, having entered into
an agreement with an Argentine firm.65 While we may expect the level of interaction
to be low-Argentina itself is starved for capital presentIy-and while the move
should not have offended nationalist sensibilities in that Brazil and Argentina
increasingly appreciate the value of cooperating and presenting to the developed world
a united front, we see here still the Brazilian state's demonstrated readiness to look
outside the nation for production partners.
So urgent, it would seem, has the imperative become that the state has in fact been
willing to move further and risk nationalist resentment-indeed, the military's
displeasure-by permitting greater foreign involvement in even the area of national
resources. Thus, the CRVD, the state mining company, has made known its intention
of entering into manganese production with the Soviet Union.66 Further, in clear
contrast to the global trend, and as if to make up for declining business relations with
Black Africa, the CR VD has be en collaborating in the production of nickel at Morro
Velho with Anglo-American, a local subsidiary of a South African firmo Indeed,42
percent of Brazil's mining sector is now foreign-owned, a figure that, while including
many minority positions for foreign investors within joint ventures, has so alarmed
Brazil's lower congressional house that it has responded with a bill insuring national
control of strategic mineral deposits. Still, the Brazilian state appears for the most part
determined to press its enterprises to cooperate with foreign capital on behalf of its
transnationalist-minded bourgeois constituency.
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Even in the area of infonnatics-assured, it was thought, by a very visible market
reserve law-regime incumbents appear to be contemplating ways of allowing for an
expanded foreign roleo The requirement that foreign finns share their technology as
the price of admission into the Brazilian national market is being steadily relaxed: a
consortium is planned involving a Brazilian capital finn and a foreign company similar
to those formed for undertaking federal projects in the past. 67 Providing easier access
for foreign participation in this once steadfastly protected area around which Sarney
had seemed to draw the line would clearly suggest the in tended restoration of
"predemocratic" accumulation patterns.
To secure the involvement of the local bourgeoisie and to complete the financial
triangle will be more difficult: local investment capital is apparently as limited at the
moment as is that of the state enterprises. Nonetheless, the state is actively looking for
new ways to recruit bourgeois interest and retain such investment capital as it
possesses within the country. Consider the following very pragmatic approach: the
Central Bank has begun numbered accounts in which individuals may deposit funds
that they are holding illegally, that is, that have not been declared for tax purposes.
The incentive for the bourgeoisie to do so lies in the fact that the deposits will be
invested and the gains returned to those from whom the capital has been gotten, an
arrangement meant to induce more proper entrepreneurial spirit and Brazil's economic
growth. The fact of the policy's restraint and essential regard for the bourgeoisie is
made plain when we consider that a state more firmly committed to egalitarianism
might simply expropriate such funds. And while a systematic confiscation of privately
held property is, of course, unlikely in the Brazilian case, the state is nonetheless
willing to make such populist gestures in isolated instances in preparation for elections
as, for example, when it seized cattle withheld from market in the wake of Cruzado
Plan price freezes.
State Enterprise Projects
We might briefly consider a few other state enterprise-related and regressive political-
economic indices, though data at this time are sparse. Regarding the large
infrastructural projects once squarely in the domain of the state companies, data are
rare indeed, owing both to the short length of time that has elapsed since the
Constituent Assembly elections and because the public deficit makes such spending
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very unlikely. Still, some hint of the state enterprises' continuing preference for
"center-right" development projects can be gotten from a small number of reported
items.
For example, the state was long involved in constructing a railroad extending from
Belo Horizonte to Volta Redonda known as the Ferrovia de Aco, an undertaking that
consumed $2 billion and carne to represent an especial exemplo gritante of state
enterprise indisciplina.68 Finance Minister Dilson Funaro accordingly ordered the
project stopped prior to the elections. But as the railroad is, even in its evidentIy
incomplete form, the conduit for most of Brazil's exported steel, it has been
recognized as national infrastructure and thus of interest to Brazil's relevant state
enterprises. Thus, the road has reemerged after the elections "like a kind of state
zombie"; despite severe capital shortages, the state has restarted the project in
collaboration with Reunited Brazilian Minerals (MBR), the principal private enterprise
using the route.69 The government has defended its participation by showing its
assessed contribution to be far less than in most such undertakings, but it could be
argued that to the extent that it has particpated at all, it can be said to be allocating
publicly owned resources to an export-led, distributively regressive developmental
model affordable in a democratic period only after elections have beeen successfully
contested by incumbents.
State Enterprise-Produced Goods
Recall that the Cruzado Plan had frozen the prices of all state enterprises, so the
already favorable steel rates become artificially more favorable still, a fact that persisted
despite the Cruzadinho's impact upon downstream, finished product prices. Thus,
there is presentIy much debate at the cabinet level over what to do about Siderbras'
losing an estimated $10 million per day, Finance Minister Funaro and Planning
Minister Sayad wishing to reduce the enterprise's spending levels or even sell the
companyentirely.7° This, as we have seen, is improbable. Minister of Industry and
Commerce Castelo Branco has articulated the more likely outcome in the postelectoral
period: he has recommended that Siderbras' autonomy and control of its projects be
left undisturbed and that its entire deficit of 128 billion cruzados be absorbed by the
Treasury and that, further, the Treasury inject into Siderbras still more investment. In
this instance, then, a state effort to maintain a state enterprise would be less for
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immediate patronage possibilities than to insure guiding economic growth by the terms
of a preferred economic strategy.
There is little such debate, however, about the projects expressly preferred by the
military. Even early in 1986, with tight budgetary constraints and electoral
preparations beginning, the military embarked upon its cosdy reequipment program
known as FT-90 requiring $250 million per year.71 We learn additionally that
sufficient funding has been found to relocate the Armed Forces Technology Center
(CENTEX), hub of the military's arm-producing companies, to the agreeable setting
of Rio de Janeiro. The military has further embellished its position with the purchase
of Helibras, the helicopter-manufacturing division, and a satellite communication
system with money apparently transferred from the Ministries of Communication,
Health, and the Interior as well as from continued borrowing from abroad.72 And
finally, the military has been expanding its nuclear program, hiring technicians from
Nuclebras even as civilian officials conclude that the enterprise, and indeed, its nuclear
power objective, are no longer worth the investment.
Privatization and Rationalization
But while military-run enterprises and undertakings may be expected to continue
unabated, the state, for its part, may in the wake of elections have renewed opportunity
to act upon its rationalization and privatization goals where explicidy state-owned-as
opposed to rnilitary-controlled--enterprises are involved. Thus, we should not be
surprised to find that in late November 1986, the Interministerial Council of
Privatization grew more assertive, drawing press attention to its researching the
complex legal procedures for selling off state companies. The Minister of Urban
Development has supplied an actual short-term list of enterprises and facilities to be
sold that includes Coalbra, a wood alcohol plant, the Aluminum Company of the
Northeast (ALUNE), and a variety of other evidendy unneeded manufacturing plants.
Dilson Funaro has further proposed the immediate merger or outright closing of fifteen
state enterprises and agencies with another thirty-two to follow.73 The observer might
be inclined, of course, to dismiss all this as the best of intentions and even obligatory
rhetoric, at least until confronting the recent case of the National Housing Bank. That
institution has been sacrificed to the economizing design: that is to say, it has been
closed outright, its accounts and assets transferred to the Federal Economic Exchange,
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and 6,000 of its 8,260 funcionarios slated for dismissal. Further, the erstwhile
BNH's tower headquarters in Rio de Janeiro-"the definitive example of ostentation
that marked the style of other eonstruetion ereeted by the government in the past to
'headquarter' state enterprises"-has been put up for sale. Veja magazine eoncluded
its pieee on the closing of the National Housing Bank by eharaeterizing it as for "22
years eonstituting one of the eeonomie sores of the eountry. "74
State Enterprise Pricing Policy
A final state enterprise-related area to be eonsidered is prieing poliey. It was suggested
in the hypotheses that inereasing the rates for publie utilities and transportation
adversely affeet the poor and was an "undemoeratie" way of treating the publie defieit
and exeessive eonsumer spending. Thus, while the Cruzado Plan's populist tone is
refleeted in its having frozen utility and transportation rates-and indeed, state
enterprise priees are still frozen for the most part-eonsider some of the less-
publieized priee adjustments that have been introdueed under the terms of Cruzado II:
(a) inereased tariffs for publie goods and serviees, partieularly water, eleetrieity,
telephone, and post rates; (b) a redefinition of the terms of eost-of-living adjustments
in whieh workers that negotiated wage inereases sinee February were made ineligible
for the 20 pereent wage adjustment seheduled for when inflation reaehed that same
mark (the inflation rate has long sinee surpassed this figure); and (e) a new eonsumer
priee index ineorporating only subsistenee goods and applieable to those earning less
than $300 per month-a meehanism designed, it would appear, to yield a
disingenuous inflation reading.75 Thus, while the Cruzadinho is eommonly eited as a
progressive instrument for eheeking an overheated eeonomy in that it levied prohibitive
taxes upon ears, travel, investments, and the like, there is quite another, belated side to
the package as well.
A clearer opportunity to measure Brazil's democratizing intent along the dimension
of utility priees may beeome available shortIy in the eountry's southern states.
Eleetrobras offieials have reeently warned that beeause of low rainfall and redueed
reservoir levels, Itaipu's hydroeleetrie eapaeity will be temporarily unable in future
months to meet eurrent eonsumption rates.76 It will be worth watehing the way the
government responds to this-either by permitting the market to alloeate energy on the
basis of ability to pay, or, as is more likely, invoking some rationing seheme resulting
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in preferred rates either for industry or for private consumers. The government's
decision, of course, by the logic of this paper, will be telling for democracy.
CONCLUSION
If we can separate out the deficit factor-and economic constraints more generally-
we can then largely regard this paper's politically based hypotheses as still standing.
Some have been less successfully formulated than others, and all must be qualified by
the recognition that upon the completion of e1ections, state enterprises will begin to
revert to the essentially predemocratic development tasks that they have been more
usually charged with in Brazil. Thus, it would be incorrect to cite a steadfast
correlation between authoritarian regimes and capital-accumulating state enterprises on
the one hand, and competive regimes and redistributive state enterprises on the other.
To some extent, then, recent changes in Brazil's regime form and attendant modes
of public sector operation are more apparent than real: bourgeois property rights,
corporate military privilege, and a rapid, if skewed, growth model that guarantees
these sectors' continued favor are all probably inviolable. Moreover, only if these
features can be preserved in a context of competitive politics at but small additional
economic cost to the bourgeoisie and the rnilitary will politically democratic procedure
persist in Brazil: should fundamental tampering with the distribution of values occur,
or should even a bothersome inefficiency come to enervate the economy, these same
actors will once again exchange democracy, such as it is, for the unp1easantness of
authoritarian repression. Both variants incur costs. It is simply a matter of bourgeois
and military elites' selecting the regime type that appears to them the more affordable-
though they may enter into their calculus the greater normative, contemporary
respectability of democracy.
Substantial ambiguity, then, pervades almost every effort to link regime types and
the objectives assigned Brazil's state enterprises. The pattern recorded in this paper
wherein reelected officials deemphasize state enterprise-generated redistribution in
"secure" months after their reelection certainly negates the validity of a concise and
clearly delimited cyclical model of authoritarian-democratic public sector operation.
But at the same time, sufficient supporting data have been presented here to lend this
paper's argument plausibility: that is, Brazil's regime incumbents will mobilize parallel
bureaucracy in demonstrated ways to defray democracy's electoral challenge. And the
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hope, further, is that the growth objectives that Brazilian state enterprises are often
capable of meeting will not be so thoroughly sacrificed that authoritarian political
actors soon invite themselves back once again.
NOTES
1. Bendito Rosa do Espirito Santo writes: "A experiencia recente do Brasil e
Argentina mostra a presen<;a e o avan<;o constante do Setor Estatal, sendo que no caso
brasileiro se assiste hoje a um processo de abertura política, enquanto na Argentina as
li berdades democraticas se mantem bastan te res tritas." "S etor Estatal e
Desenvolvimento," in A Empresa Pública no Brasil: Uma Abordagem
Multidisciplinar-Coletanea de Monografia (Brasília: Instituto de Planejamento
Econ6mico e Social, Secretaria de Moderniza<;ao e Reforma Administrativa, 1989)
(hereafter, A Empresa Pública no Brasil), p. 118.
2. The argument is perhaps most effectively presented by Guillermo O'Donnell in
Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics
(University of California at Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1973). See
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